or predicate offenses. To successfully allege a RICO offense, it is also necessary to prove the existence of an enterprise as described in § 1961 (4). 8 Although Congress originally enacted OCCA, including RICO, to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States," 9 the language of RICO is broad and not specifically limited to organized crime.' 0 Over the years, courts have attempted to interpret the meaning of these general terms to determine the appropriate scope of RICO.
A. THE HISTORICALLY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF RICO
For years, the United States Supreme Court has given RICO a broad reading." For example, the Court in United States v. Turkette' 2 refused to limit the scope of RICO to legitimate enterprises, holding that the general language of § 1961 (4)'s description of enterprise "include[s] both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope."' 3 The defendant in this case was an alleged member of an illegitimate enterprise involved in drug trafficking, arson, insurance fraud, bribery, attempted bribery of police officers, and corruption of the judicial system.' 4 The Court rejected the defendant's argument "that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise."' 5 section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
8 Section 1961 (4) states that " ' enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. 9 OCCA, 84 Stat. at 923. 10 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) . "The occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime. " Id. 11 Instead, the Court interpreted the term "enterprise" broadly. The Court reasoned that, if Congress had intended enterprise to include only legitimate enterprises, it "could easily have ... insert[ed] a single word, 'legitimate." ' 16 Although the Court in Turkette was not expressly addressing whether RICO requires that the enterprise have an economic motive, the Court defined enterprise as "an entity,... a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct," 17 which does not require an economic motive. Thus, the Court established precedent for a liberal reading of RICO, and specifically the term "enterprise."
In a series of decisions following its broad interpretation of RICO in Turkette, the Supreme Court, as well as the Seventh Circuit, continued to refuse to judicially legislate restrictions into RICO. Both courts repeatedly held that RICO was an unambiguous Act and that Congress purposefully employed broad language, that courts should not construe narrowly.' 8 First, in the 1984 case Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,' 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to limit the applications of RICO when it rejected special standing and injury requirements for civil RICO plaintiffs. 2 0 The defendants were a bank that made loans to the plaintiff corporations, the officer and director of the bank, and the parent company of the bank. 2 1 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants used "the mails in furtherance of the alleged scheme to defraud plaintiffs by overstating the prime interest rate."
22 Such a fact pattern is not typical of the organized crime that Congress sought to eradicate through RICO, and "it does not seem at all likely that Congress anticipated the application of civil RICO to improperly calculated interest charges by a commercial bank." 23 Yet, the court concluded that it would not exclude the defendants' conduct from the reach of RICO. The court found that since "Congress deliberately chose to employ broad terms which would defy judicial confinement... it does not seem fitting for [the court] to attempt to narrow the statute in ways which are nearly impossible to rationalize merely to exclude subjects RICO of this kind." 24 The court further explained that, "the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." 25 Shortly after Haroco, the Supreme Court rejected a special standing requirement for civil RICO plaintiffs in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., Inc. 26 The fact pattern in Sedima also did not involve organized crime. The dispute arose when ajoint international venture between the Belgian company, Sedima, and the New York company, Imrex, went awry. 27 Sedima alleged that Imrex committed "violations of § 1962(c), based on ... mail and wire fraud" 28 when Imrex "present[ed] inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses." 29 The Court rejected the Second Circuit's amorphous "organized crime" standing requirement that demanded a RICO plaintiff to "allege a 'racketeering injury'-an injury 'different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter.'" 3 0 The Court concluded that courts should not narrow RICO in this way, but instead should construe it broadly for two reasons. 3 ' First, because Congress purposely left the language in RICO broad; 3 2 and second, because Congress expressly stated that RICO was to "be liberally construed." 3 3 In addition, the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that "the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity [,] The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, provided the occasion for our examination of the working of our system of criminal justice. But should it follow . . . that any proposals for action stemming from that examination be limited to organized crime? This line of analysis ... is seriously defective in several regards. Initially, it confuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of our system of criminal justice with the proper scope of any new principle or lesson derived from that reexamination.
In addition, the objection confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a court. Out of a proper sense of their limited lawmaking function, courts ought to confine their judgments to the facts of the cases before them. But the Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual instances, but whole problems. In that connection, it has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legislation. Whatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, the Congress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem. Comprehensive solutions to identified problems must be translated into well integrated legislative programs.
The objection, moreover, has practical as well as theoretical defects. Even as to the titles of [the OCCA bill] needed primarily in organized crime cases, there are very real limits on the degree to which such provisions can be strictly confined to organized crime cases ....
On the other hand, each title ... which is justified primarily in organized crime prosecutions has been confined to such cases to the maximum degree possible, while preserving the ability to administer the act and its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. Despite these decisions establishing a trend of liberal RICO interpretation, a split developed among the courts of appeals on the issue of whether RICO requires "the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering [to be] motivated by an economic purpose."4 Both the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit maintained that an economic motive requirement exists in RICO. In contrast, the Third Circuit held that RICO does not require an economic motive.
Second Circuit
The Second Circuit first established the economic motive requirement in United States v. Ivic. 4 7 The defendants in Ivic were Croatian terrorists convicted of "conspir[ing] to kill or otherwise injure" the Secretary General of the Croatian National Congress,48 attempting to bomb several locations, and "conspir[ing] to transport and utilize explosives." 4 9 These acts provided possible predicate offenses for the RICO count of the indictment- 50 The indictment described the alleged RICO enterprise as a "criminal enterprise" whose "primary object... [was] that the defendants would and did use terror, assassination, bombings, and violence in order to foster and promote their beliefs and in order to eradicate and injure persons who they perceived as in opposition to their beliefs." 5 1 The court held that RICO did not apply to these defendants because neither the enterprise nor testimony for a legal proceeding, upon motion by the Attorney General certifying that 'the legal proceeding is against a person who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity. ' The court provided four reasons for requiring an economic motive. 5 3 First, the court decided that, because the term "enterprise" as used in subsections 1962(a) and (b) clearly refers to an "organized profit-seeking venture," it must assume that the term has the same economic meaning in subsection 1962(c). 54 Second, the court concluded that the ordinary meaning of the words "corrupt" and "racketeer influenced" in the title of the statute mandates an economic motive requirement. 55 Third, the court found that Congress did not intend RICO to cover non-economic activity because the statement of findings prefacing OCCA does not cover non-economic activity. 56 Thus, the court held it was beyond the purpose of RICO "to pre- The statement of findings reads: The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
Further, the court stated that "Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, made clear on several occasions that the purpose of Title IX is 'economic' and that the only crimes included in § 1961(1) are those adapted to 'commercial exploitation'." Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63. RICO ized crime elements." 5 7 Finally, the court found persuasive the 1981 Justice Department's RICO Guidelines that require an enterprise to have an economic goal. 5 8 In United States v. Bagari, 59 the Second Circuit next addressed the issue of a RICO economic motive requirement. In Bagaric, the court clarified its holding in Ivic, specifying that the economic motive requirement is sufficiently satisfied if the purpose for committing the RICO predicate act is economically motivated and not the enterprise itself. 60 The defendants in Bagaric, like those in Ivic, were Croatian terrorists. However, in addition to their politically-motivated bombings and murders, the defendants committed murders in an attempt to extort money "'to further [their] activities."' 61 Thus, the court distinguished the defendants in Bagaric on the grounds that they were "'motivated' by political as well as economic goals," 62 whereas the defendants in Ivic were motivated solely by political goals. The court in Bagaric declined to require the government to prove that the ultimate purpose of the enterprise is economic, 63 noting that "the Ivic court nowhere stated ... that economic gain must be the sole motive of every RICO enterprise." 64 To support its version of the economic motive requirement, the court in Bagaric used two of the same arguments the court in Ivic used-the meaning of the words in the title Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations, and RICO's purpose as expressed by Congress in the statement of findings prefacing RICO. 65 First, the court in Bagaric found that since the defendants used the very tactics that the dictionary uses to define "corrupt" and "racketeer," 6 6 the ordinary meanings of "Corrupt" and "Racketeer" encompass "terrorist groups [like the one in Bagaric,] which finance their violent activities through extortionate means." 6 7 Second, the court in Bagaric concluded that "apart from the reference to 'organized crime,'" 6 8 the purpose of RICO as expressed in the statement of findings-to stop activities which "drain[ ] billions of dollars from America's economy by-unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption" 6 9 -"clearly covers the conduct of' the terrorists in the Bagaric case who committed extortion to gain money to support their cause. 70 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Bagaric in United States v. Ferguson. 7 1 In Ferguson, the court reiterated that RICO "merely [requires] 'some financial purpose' either to the criminal enterprise or the acts of racketeering." 72 Defendants were members of "The Family," 73 and "self-professed revolutionaries" 74 who helped a Black Liberation Army leader escape from jail. 75 The defendants committed armed robberies "to support enterprise members and to maintain safe houses." 76 Thus, similar to the defendants in Bagaric, the ultimate purpose of the defendants in Ferguson was non-economic, but the crimes they committed were "economic crimes." 
Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, interpreted RICO as requiring an economic motive. The Eighth Circuit first mentioned an economic motive requirement in United States v. Anderson. 78 The defendants in Anderson were county administrators alleged to have accepted bribes and kickbacks in a scheme to defraud the citizens of two counties. 7 9 The court held that the facts of the case did not fall within 67 Id. The court relied on WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1977), which defined "corrupt" as "characterized by bribery, the selling of political favors, or other improper conduct," and which defined "racketeer" as "one who extorts money or advantages by threats of violence, by blackmail, or by unlawful interference with business or employment" Bagaric 706 F.2d at 57 n.13 (quoting WEBsrER'S NEW COLLEGATE DIC-TIONARY (5th ed. 1977)). 
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[Vol. 85 RICO the meaning of the term "enterprise" as described in § 1961(4) of RICO because the enterprise was not an "association that is substantially different from the acts which form the 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" 80 The court interpreted the term "enterprise" "to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity."' 8 Thus, the Eighth Circuit created the Anderson definition of "enterprise;" however, the court "provide[d] very little explanation for the 'economic goal' part of [the] definition," 82 merely referring to the fact that the purpose of RICO is economic. 8 3 Moreover, the economic goal portion of the Anderson definition was "entirely dicta," 8 4 since the defendants in the case unquestionably had an economic motive for their actions 5 and the court only "set forth th[e] economic goal requirement as part of its discussion of a distinct enter-, prise requirement." 8 6 Regardless of these limitations on precedential value, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Neapolitan, 87 adopted the Anderson definition of "enterprises," which also laid the foundation for the subsequent Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. _'ynn. 88 In Flynn, the defendant was charged under RICO for "participat [ing] in an organization which engaged in a series of violent crimes in an attempt to obtain and maintain control of various labor (1986) . The Seventh Circuit holding in Neapolitan, like the Eighth Circuit's decision in Anderson, "distinguished between the racketeering acts and the enterprise." NOW, 968 F.2d at 627 (citing Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500). The case involved "police officers [who] took bribes from car thieves, and were charged with conducting the sheriff's office (the enterprise) through a pattern of racketeering activity," and also the "car thieves themselves [who] operated a large scale 'chop shop,' which was allegedly the RICO enterprise." Id. Whether the defendants were motivated by financial gain was not an issue in the case because it was obvious that they were. Id. However, in concluding that the racketeering acts must be separate from the enterprise, the Neapolitan court specifically adopted the Anderson definition of "enterprise" containing the "economic motive" language. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500. 
Third Circuit
In contrast to the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Third Circuit determined that RICO does not require an economic motive. The Third Circuit in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonag0 4 held that where economic motive is not necessary to commit the predicate offense, there is no separate economic requirement under RICO. 95 In this case, a women's health center brought a RICO action "against a group of anti-abortion activists." 9 6 As the RICO predicate offense, the clinic alleged acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951, 97 which is an offense that does not require an economic motive. The court concluded that, if the elements of the RICO predicate offense have been satisfied, RICO requires no additional proof of an economic motive. 98 Specifically, the court found the defendants' actions for which the jury convicted them were the very acts the statutes proscribed and that the defendants were not immunized from punish- Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988 02 To further this purpose, these anti-abortion activists and organizations committed the following unlawful acts: organized "blitzes" on clinics, in which protesters blockaded the clinics, disabled the locks to the clinics with glue, and locked themselves to the clinic doors; led an invasion of a Florida clinic in which protesters injured the clinic administrator and another woman and destroyed clinic property; threatened those who conduct business with the clinics; and maintained connections with arsonists who have fire-bombed clinics. 0 3 Further, several of the protesters allegedly stole fetal remains from a medical testing laboratory named Vital-Med Laboratories, which reportedly was a participant in this scheme. In response to these and similar acts by PLAN and its members, the National Organization for Women (NOW) and two health care centers, Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. (DWHO) and Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. (SWHO),105 filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the named members of PLAN 10 6 (hereinafter "protesters") and Vital-Med Laboratories. 107 The suit alleged that the protesters, contributed in order to promote the extortionate activities of defendants," 119 the "supporters of defendant organizations were not extorted, either directly or indirectly, into contributing to the organizations." 120 Third, the district court held that § 1962(c) of RICO requires an economic motive "to the extent that some profitgenerating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO claim." 12 1 The court found that the protesters' acts were not motivated by economics, but by moral and political goals. Thus, the court dismissed the § 1962(c) claim. 122 Finally, the court dismissed the § 1962 (d) conspiracy claim because it was dependent on whether the plaintiffs prevailed in the other two RICO claims. 12 3 And once the court dismissed all of the federal claims, the pendent state claims lacked jurisdiction.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, 12 5 "despite the reprehensible nature of the defendants' activities." 12 6 The court of appeals rejected the district court's use of NoerMotorFreight, Inc. in dismissing the antitrust claims.
127 Instead, the court of appeals found that the legislative and economic history of the Sherman Act showed that "the Sherman The court concluded that the economic motive requirement established in this line of cases was warranted, 3 4 despite the Seventh Circuit's traditionally broad interpretation of RICO,' 3 5 and despite the fact that "'the breadth of the statute ... was the result of deliberate policy choices on the part of Congress." ' 36 The court of appeals provided several reasons justifying its decision that an economic motive requirement was warranted. First, following the analysis of the Second Circuit in Ivic, 137 the court of appeals argued that the "use of the term enterprise in § § 1962(a) and (b) conveys a restriction to economic entities." 138 141 NOW, 968 F.2d at 629. The court of appeals made this argument in response to the holding in Sedima that the "courts should not graft on additional elements" to RICO. Id.
(citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497). 142 The court of appeals provided the following quote for support Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises. Legitimate businesses enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences; and, as a result, § 1964(c)'s use against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.
clusion that non-economic crimes committed in furtherance of noneconomic motives are not within the ambit of RICO." 14 3 Finally, the court felt the economic motive requirement had support in the decisions in Anderson, Neapolitan, and Flynn.'" Based on the above considerations, the court of appeals held that RICO does not apply to situations where neither the enterprise nor the predicate acts are economically motivated.' 4 5 After finding that RICO requires an economic motive, the court of appeals rejected petitioners' arguments that the increased costs to the clinics as a result of the protesters' actions satisfied the economic requirement 46 The court "refuse [d] Moreover, the court of appeals concurred with the district court's disposition of the § § 1962(a) and (d) RICO claims.' 4 9 NOW, DWHO, and SWHO, appealed.
Recognizing a developing conflict among the courts of appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 50 to "determine whether RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose.
" 15 1
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that RICO does not require proof that "the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose.
" 1 52 The majority found that neither the language Examining the language of RICO, Chief'Justice Rehnquist found that neither § 1962(c) nor § 1961, which define the terms used in RICO, indicate that RICO requires an economic motive.' 5 5 The Chief Justice paid special attention to the § 1962(c) phrase, "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce," because that language "comes the closest of any language in subsection (c) to suggesting a need for an economic motive."' 5 6
Based on Webster's Third New International Dictionary's definition of the word "affect"'-"to have a detrimental influence on"' 5 7 -ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that a RICO enterprise does not have to have "its own profit-seeking motives" to satisfy § 1962(c). 158 Surely, an enterprise could "have a detrimental influence on interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives." 15 9 Consistent with the definitional analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the court of appeals' view that the economic use of the word "enterprise" in subsections 1962(a) and (b) implies an economic motive requirement for the enterprise in subsection (c).160 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the rule the court of appeals relied uponthat "'[a court] should not lightly infer that Congress intended' terms 'to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections'"' 6 -does not apply to the term "enterprise" in subsections 1962 (a), (b), and (C). 1 6 2 The Chief Justice found this to be the case because "the term 'enterprise' in subsections (a) and (b) plays a different role in the following allegations incorporated into the petitioners' § 1962(c) claim satisfy this standard: "respondents conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working and obtain medical services elsewhere," Id.; the "conspiracy 'has injured the business and/or property interests of the' petitioners," Id. 
the structure of those subsections than it does in subsection (c)."163
In subsections (a) and (b), the enterprise is "something acquired through the use of illegal activities or by money obtained from illegal activities," 164 and thus is the "victim of unlawful activity."' 1 65 Such an enterprise "may very well be a 'profit-seeking' entity." 1 66 In contrast, in subsection (c) the term "enterprise" refers to "the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed.' 67 Thus, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that, because the enterprise in subsection (c) is not being acquired, the enterprise "need not have a property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging in illegal activity" as is likely required with an enterprise in subsections (a) and (b). 168 The majority also examined the significance of language absent from RICO in determining that the language of the statute does not imply an economic motive requirement. 69 Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to United States v. Turkette 170 for the rationale that, where "Congress could easily have narrowed the sweep of the term 'enterprise' by inserting a single word," but did not, the limitation most likely does not exist and courts should not infer it. 171 Applying this rationale to the case at bar, the majority found as persuasive evidence against requiring an economic motive' 7 2 the fact that "Congress has not, either in the definitional section or in the operative language, required that an 'enterprise' in § 1962(c) have an economic motive."17a Moreover, the majority examined the legislative history of RICO relied upon by the defendants, and concluded that the legislative history does not indicate Congress intended to proscribe an economic motive requirement. 174 However, all that these subsections mandate is that the enterprise "be an entity that was acquired through illegal activity or by money generated from illegal activity." Id. defendants argued that RICO does not cover their activities because the legislative history shows that Congress intentionally based the selection of predicate offenses on the principal of "commercial exploitation" to "preclude .. .application [of RICO] to political and social protest." 176 Defendants Terry, Project Life, and Operation Rescue further argued that the purpose of RICO as shown by the legislative history, and acknowledged by the Court in previous cases, "was to strike at the 'source of economic power' of organized crime,"' 17 7 and thus RICO does not apply to the defendants' protest activities. 178 Despite these arguments, the Court found that "the parties' submissions respecting legislative history" did not clearly express an intent on the part of Congress to require an economic motive. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a construction other than the one dictated by the unambiguous language of the statute was unwarranted.
179
Along these same lines, the majority held that the rule of lenity in criminal cases should not control the result of the case because "the rule of lenity only applies when an ambiguity is present [in the statute] ."180 According to the rule of lenity, when an ambiguity exists in the language of a criminal statute, the court should interpret the language narrowly, 181 to protect due process concerns by "giv[ing] potential criminal defendants fair warning that their conduct may be punished." 182 Although intended for criminal cases, the rule could potentially apply in a civil RICO suit to ambiguous language in § 1962(c), since criminal RICO penalties, as well as civil penalties, stem from the offenses contained in § 1962.183 The majority, however, found that there was not sufficient ambiguity in the language of RICO "to invoke the rule of lenity" 184 since "'the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." ' 185 In reaching its decision, the majority attacked the Second Cir- The majority also attacked the court of appeals' reliance on the Department ofJustice's 1981 guidelines for RICO prosecutions, which the Second Circuit also found persuasive in Ivic. 193 To charge an association as an enterprise in a RICO indictment, the 1981 Guidelines required that "the association exist[ ] 'for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal .... ,"194 In 1984, however, the Department of Justice amended the guidelines, now requiring that an "association-in-fact enterprise" as described in § 1961 (4) 195 be "directed toward an economic or other identifiable goal." 196 In sum, the majority disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the language of RICO. Instead, the majority believed that the unambiguous language of RICO warranted a finding that RICO does not contain an economic motive requirement. Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected all legislative history and other Congressional intent arguments that the court of appeals and the protesters made in support of an economic motive requirement.
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that RICO does not contain an economic motive requirement. Justice Souter rejected the protesters and amici's arguments that courts should construe RICO as requiring an economic motive to avoid "First Amendment issues that could arise from allowing RICO to be applied to protest organizations." 20 3 Justice Souter stated that such a statutory construction "applies only when the meaning of a statute is in doubt," and did not apply in the instant case because the language of RICO is unambiguous. 20 4 Justice Souter also concluded that an economic motive requirement would result in both overprotection and underprotection of First Amendment concerns and would not ad-equately protect First Amendment interests. 205 Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that an "economic-motive requirement is ... unnecessary" because "free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as they arise." 20 6 As Justice Souter suggested, RICO defendants might raise the First Amendment as grounds for dismissal and as a defense. 20 7 Furthermore, if a RICO defendant is "otherwise engag[ed] in protected expression," the First Amendment may limit the amount of relief awarded to the plaintiff, even if a RICO violation is validly established. 20 8 Thus, Justice Souter found that First Amendment challenges are not barred.
In conclusion, Justice Souter recognized the need to take "notice that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy" and "caution [ed] courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at stake." 2 09
V. ANALYSIS This Note argues that although the majority's holding that RICO applies to non-economically motivated enterprises was correct, the Court based its conclusion on inadequate considerations. The majority failed to notice the ambiguity in the term "enterprise" and should have looked to the ordinary meaning of "enterprise" to arrive at a plain meaning for the term as used in the statute. In addition, this Note concludes that the majority correctly found that Congress had no clear intent contrary to the plain meaning of the language of the statute. Finally, this Note argues that Justice Souter accurately addressed the First Amendment issues raised by the respondents and amici.
A.
THE MEANING OF THE TERM "ENTERPRISE"
In concluding that the statutory language of RICO requires no economic motive for the enterprise, the majority did not fully inquire into the meaning of the term "enterprise." Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the conduct of the enterprise described in § 1962(c). 2 10 Finding that a non-economically motivated entity's activities could "affect[ ] interstate or foreign commerce," 21 ' the Court concluded that § 1962(c) provided no indication of an economic motive requirement. 2 12 On this basis, the Court found that the language of RICO is unambiguous and, in the absence of a clear Congressional intent to the contrary, judged the inquiry into an economic motive complete.
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The Court's analysis, however, was incomplete. Although a noneconomically motivated entity may engage in activities affecting interstate or foreign commerce, it does not follow that the term "enterprise" includes non-economically motivated entities. The Court did not explore the possibility that an economic motive requirement could exist within the meaning of the term "enterprise" itself 2 1 4 Further, in contrast to the view of the Court that the language of the statute is unambiguous, the split among the circuits between those who accept the Anderson definition 2 15 of "enterprise" and those who accept the Turkette definition, 21 6 shows the exact meaning of "enterprise" is in fact ambiguous. 21 7 To accurately resolve this conflict about the plain meaning of the statute, the Court first should have looked to the ordinary meaning of the term "enterprise." 2 1 8 Then, if an analysis 210 The Court looked to the language of subsection (c) which states that an enterprise can be something "the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S. . 215 The court in Anderson defined enterprise as "an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
216 The court in Turkette defined enterprise as "an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The Court began to do this by looking at § 1961(4) "Definitions" to see if Congress provided a clear meaning of enterprise. 220 The Court concluded that the § 1961(4) definition of enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity," 2 2 1 does not indicate an economic motive. 222 A more thorough examination of the language of § 1961(4), however, reveals that § 1961(4) does not define the term enterprise 2 2 3 -"it does not state necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an enterprise" 2 24 -but merely instructs the reader not to exclude certain categories from the reader's existing understanding of the term enterprise. Scalia, J., dissenting) ). As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent in Chisom, I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If notand especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Scalia made this statement in a dissenting opinion, it has persuasive value for Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in NOW v. Scheidler, because the ChiefJustice himself, as well as Justice Kennedy, joined injustice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Chisom.
220 Now v. Scheidier, 114 S. Ct. .798, 803-04 (1994). 221 18 U.S.C. § 1961. 222 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804. 223 Section 1961(4) "describes 'enterprise' not as meaning certain enumerated items, but rather as including them. To include something is not to mean it. Indeed, to describe the term as including other things is not an attempt to define the term at all; rather, it is an attempt to provide examples." Blickensderfer, supra note 181, at 873-74.
224 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1590. 225 Id. at 1590. Section 1961(4) uses the verb "includes" in describing the term "enterprise" and not "means" as is used in describing other terms in § 1961, such as "State" and "racketeering investigation."
If Congress intended for includes to be interpreted as means, then anything that fits within one of the categories listed after includes would count as an enterprise.... [However,] § 1961 does define other terms using 'means.' ... [Thus,] [i]nasmuch as § 1961 does use different verbs in defining other words, it is reasonable to assume that includes has a different import than means in that section, just as it does in ordinary language. The use of the verb "includes" seems to assume that the reader already has an understanding of what an enterprise is, and to instruct the reader that nothing should preclude considering the listed types of entities as possible enterprises pursuant to that understanding. In particular, that understanding of the term "enterprise" is, the Court must look elsewhere for the ordinary meaning of "enterprise."
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One possible source the Court could have looked to is the dictionary definition. 227 The definition of enterprise, however, varies from dictionary to dictionary. 228 In addition, dictionaries do not necessarily represent the ordinary usage of the word. 2 29 Because of the weaknesses in relying on the dictionary as a source of ordinary meaning, a better source for the Court would have been a study done by a group of linguists to determine the ordinary meaning of enterprise as it is relevant in NOW v. Scheider. 23 0 Specifically, the linguists tested whether the Anderson definition of "enterprise" that requires an economic motive reflected ordinary usage of the word "enterprise." The linguists' study concluded that the primary criterion the majority of people look at to determine if an entity is an enterprise is whether the entity has a clear goal, which can be economic or not. 232 For a smaller group of the speech community, the primary criterion for an enterprise is whether the entity resembles a profit-seeking business, or in other words, whether it has an economic motive. 2 33 Thus, the majority of people subscribe to a "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise, while the minority of people believe in a "profit-seeking" definition of enterprise. 234 Consequently, both the Anderson definition and Turkette definition 235 appear to reflect ordinary usage. 236 § 1961(4) seems intended as a corrective against the possibility that the reader's preexisting understanding of enterprise might cause her to limit the word to legally constituted entities like corporations and partnerships. . Instead of using this rule as support for the "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise, however, the majority held that the "same meaning" rule did not apply to the situation at all since the term enterprise clearly has different functions in each subsection. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct ented meaning to all three subsections satisfying the "same meaning" rule while permitting the Court to act in congruence with its historically liberal interpretation of RICO.
Id. (citations omitted
Second, the Court should have adopted the "goal-oriented" definition as the ordinary meaning of enterprise because Congress used the verb "includes" in § 1961(4), which indicates Congress' intention "to expand the meaning of enterprise in RICO beyond businesses." 244 Third, the description of enterprise in § 1961(4) includes labor unions, a group that the linguists' study concluded that people do not include in the "profit-seeking" meaning of enterprise. 24 5 Finally, as the study indicated, the "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise is the meaning that the majority of the speech community gave the term. 2 46 Consequently, while the Chief Justice arrived at the right conclusion, that the plain meaning of RICO does not require an economic motive for the enterprise or the predicate acts, he drew this conclusion by mislabeling the statute as unambiguous and employing too sparse of a rationale. The majority opinion would have had more strength had ChiefJustice Rehnquist explored the ordinary meanings of "enterprise" and specifically adopted the "goal-oriented" definition as the plain meaning of RICO.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
After concluding that the language of RICO did not require an economic motive, the Court examined the legislative history of RICO for an express contrary intent on the part of Congress. 24 8 The Court accurately concluded that the legislative history reveals no clearly expressed Congressional intent to require an economic motive for the predicate acts or the enterprise. 249 Absent such a showing, the Court rightfully considered only the plain meaning of the statute. 25 0 There are four reasons why the legislative history is definitely void of any congressional intent to require an economic motive. First, as anyway. 260 Third, the statement of findings prefacing RICO does not mandate an economic motive requirement. 26 1 Non-economically motivated entities could also cause the negative effects Congress attributes to organized crime 262 and which Congress intended to remedy. For example, as the majority pointed out, "predicate acts, such as the alleged extortion, may not benefit the protesters financially but still may drain money from the economy by harming businesses such as the clinics which are petitioners in this case." 2 63 In the same respect, noneconomically motivated entities, such as those motivated by political or religious beliefs, may "infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and . . . subvert and corrupt our democratic processes." 2 64 Furthermore, entities motivated by religious and political beliefs may "weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." 265 The majority was correct that the "statement of congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement of economic motive neither expressed nor, we think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act." 26 6 Finally, requiring an economic motive would not bring RICO in line with the intent of Congress to eradicate organized crime.
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Since organized crime enterprises are not the only enterprises with economic motives, an economic motive requirement would not exclude RICO from non-mafioso type businesses. Consequently, an economic motive requirement does not accurately implement or clearly represent the goal of RICO. For these reasons, the legislative history fails to show that Congress clearly intended to require plaintiffs to allege an economic motive in asserting, a RICO claim. Under these circumstances, it was correct for the majority to rely solely on the plain meaning of the statute and conclude that RICO does not require an economic motive. It is a long stated policy of the Court that "in determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" 268 C.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT Procedurally, the majority was correct not to consider the protester's and amici's First Amendment arguments that "application of RICO to antiabortion protesters could chill legitimate expression protected by the First Amendment." 269 The First Amendment, however, is peripherally implicated by the majority's decision; RICO may reach enterprises that typically engage in activities protected by the First Amendment, but whose conduct has crossed the line into unprotected activities prohibited under RICO. In addressing this First Amendment issue in his concurring opinion, Justice Souter correctly concluded that reading an economic motive requirement into RICO is unnecessary because First Amendment concerns can be "raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as they arise."
27 0 Yet, Justice Souter's warning that it is still "prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy" 27 1 should not go unheeded. Justice Souter's conclusion that courts may address First Amendment concerns on a case by case basis is sound. 2 7 2 As Justice Souter persuasively argues, to require an economic motive instead would be 271 AL (Souter, J., concurring).
272 Id. at 806-07 (Souter, J., concurring).
overprotective of First Amendment interests. 273 An enterprise that does not have an economic motive may still engage in acts that amount to violent RICO predicate offenses, which the First Amendment does not protect. There is a potential problem, however, with deciding First Amendment matters individually. Specifically, courts will have to distinguish protected activities from unprotected activities when applying RICO to politically and religiously motivated enterprises like PLAN.274 Along these lines, one commentator complains that the majority decision will chill legitimate protected First Amendment activity because "[i] deological protesters, left uncertain as to the boundary between protected and unprotected conduct, will refrain from engaging in protected expression in order to avoid the uncertain line of demarcation." 275 A simple way to clarify the "line of demarcation" is for courts to consider an activity unprotected if it amounts to racketeering activity under RICO. Section 1961 (1) defines precisely what conduct constitutes racketeering activity.
2 76 This standard would not chill protected speech, and it would help control ideological groups that have crossed the line to violence, murder, and terrorism. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Court will establish this standard. As Justice Souter pointed out, "conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion .... or one of the other, more elastic RICO predicate acts may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment aCtiVity." 277 If this is the case, then plaintiffs and defendants will have to rely on precedent to determine where courts draw the line between protected and unprotected activity. Until the courts establish what is protected activity and what is not, there will be some uncertainty for ideological protesters; however, there is uncertainty whenever the courts are in the process of interpreting the Constitution.
A better method of establishing what is protected activity and what is not would be for Congress to expressly and clearly make the determination. This would provide defendants with the notice necessary to organize their actions to avoid RICO suits or prosecutions.
D. FUTURE APPLICATIONS
Without an economic motive restriction, RICO will cover enter- Once the courts or Congress establish a clear demarcation between protected and unprotected activity, then the broad application of RICO will benefit society. It will help control and hopefully alienate organizations of moral protesters that terrorize innocent people, while protecting those who peacefully protest within the ambit of the First Amendment. The Court's decision not to place an economic restriction on the RICO enterprise is in line with the purpose of RICO "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States." 28 l A liberal interpretation of enterprise allows RICO to apply to new forms of organized crime, such as organized violence by ideological and moral activists-organized crime of a type the drafters of RICO probably had not envisioned, but which are covered by the broad language Congress decided to adopt VI . CONCLUSION Based on the plain meaning of RICO, the Court in NOW held that RICO does not require the enterprise or the racketeering activity to be economically motivated. 2 8 2 The Court found that legislative history and other sources of Congressional intent failed to show Congress had a strong desire to the contrary.
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This Note argued that while the Court arrived at the correct interpretation of RICO, the Court should have looked for the ordinary meaning of the term "enterprise" to determine the plain meaning of the statute. Then, presented with two ordinary meanings, the Court should have adopted the "goal-oriented" definition that does not re- quire an economic motive. In addition, this Note argued that the Court was correct in finding that the legislative history shows no clear Congressional intent to require an economic motive. Thus, the Court's rejection of an economic motive requirement was the appropriate result; if the Court had held otherwise, it would have violated the separation of powers doctrine by judicially legislating restrictions into the broad language of RICO. Finally, this Note asserted that the majority's decision to allow non-economically motivated predicate acts and enterprises within the ambit of RICO does not infringe upon the First Amendment.
